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Big Mother: The State's Use Of Mental
Health Experts In Dependency Cases

George J. Alexander*
INTRODUCTION

This Article centers on child dependency proceedings. It is
designed principally to examine the use of mental health (psychological and psychiatric) professionals in that context.' Child
dependency proceedings are the process by which the state
examines allegations that children are abused, mistreated or subject
to improper care. As a result of determinations made in these
proceedings, parents may be required to reform their treatment and
care of their children, may be temporarily deprived of custody, or
may have their parental rights permanently terminated.
There is some overlap in the use of mental health professionals
in dependency and their use in other fields. Thus, after a brief
statement of the rationale for the role of psychologists/psychiatrists
in dependency proceedings, this Article will survey how such
specialists have performed in other contexts. As a counterweight to
the abuses in fields, such as testimony concerning the insanity
defense, involuntary commitment and conservatorship, this Article
notes the rise of criticism and attempts to moderate the impact of
mental health testimony.
Thereafter, this Article sketches the child dependency issues
which regularly draw mental health expert testimony and evaluate
the impact of such testimony. The Article reviews the literature on
deficiencies in mental health expertise and practical pressures on
experts which seem to make the use of testimony of psychiatrists
*
B.A., J.D., University of Pennsylvania, LL.M., J.S.D. Yale, Professor of Law, Santa Clara
University. The author thanks Professor Michael S. Wald for his helpful advice and his Research
Assistants, Kathleen Howington and Denise E. Stich for their untiring assistance.
1. The author hopes to address other aspects of child dependency proceedings in later articles
under the Big Mother umbrella.
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and psychologists inappropriate for many of the issues in which it
is routinely used.
CHILD PLACEMENT AND THE CALL FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTISE

It is clear that there is now, and has for a long time been,
dissatisfaction with the resolution of child placement cases. While
there is a long standing commitment to the overriding interests of
children,2 there is no certainty about how best to insure that
children are protected from abuse and neglect by their caretakers.
Ubiquitous child abuse reporting laws insure that even merely
suspicious circumstances be made known to the authorities.3 In
consequence of these laws and other policies, numerous children4
are processed by courts to determine whether they ought to be
placed in homes other than their present ones, either permanently
or merely for a short period in which to allow their caretakers to
resolve any current problems and retake them.' Believing, as
conventional wisdom has it, that bonding with a parent or substitute

2. Concern for children has overridden the protection of the home in child pornography
cases. It has conquered doctrines of free speech when children are part of the audience. It has
justified a school system in which administrators are allowed to suppress literature, silence speech,
and demand conformity. As this Article will remind, it has overridden the rights of parents to raise
their children.
3. See generally Margaret H. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Tunefor a Change,
20 FAM. L. Q. 141 (1986), reprintedin DouGLAs J. BasHAROV, PROrEcrNo CHILDREN FROM ABUSE
AND NEaLECT 9 (1988).
4. See generally NATIONAL COMMTTE FOR PREVENnON OF CHtLD ABUSE, CURRENT
TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND FATALITIES (1990) (reporting the results of the 1989
annual fifty state survey, which compares a total of 7,559 reports of sexual abuse to reporting
agencies in 1976 with a total of 200,000 reported in 1986, the last year for which comprehensive
national figures are available).
5.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) (West Supp. 1993).
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caretaker is essential, 6 laws typically provide a relatively short
period in which to make final dispositional decisions.'
The child placement process customarily involves a court, and
may involve a number of attorneys.8 Despite the number of
attorneys attempting to resolve the custody issue, it is often
impossible to ascertain uncontested accounts of the conduct of the
child or of the child's caretakers.9 Since such issues are usually
crucial to the resolution of dependency cases, a variety of experts
are regularly employed to help the court. Of interest to this Article
is the use of mental health professionals: psychiatrists and
psychologists. Precisely because these professionals have a forensic
role in the resolution of other types of legal issues, this Article will
also address them. Whenever the expertise of mental health
professionals is invoked, it is usually, as here, because there is a
desire to have certain conduct evaluated or to obtain help in
recreating the past or predicting the future conduct of one of the
persons in whom the court is interested.
If one could only know more about an individual child's needs
and the prospects for its development in alternative settings, that
would help the dependency process a great deal. If only we could
be sure which options would best serve the development of happy,
healthy and productive adults, we might be inclined singlemindedly

6. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN rr AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREsTS OF TmE CHILD 6 (1979)
(Every child needs the "unbroken continuity of [an] affectionate stimulating relationship with an
adult."); see also John Batt, Child Custody Disputes and Beyond the Best Interests Paradigm:A
ContemporaryAssessment ofthe Goldstein/FreudSomitPositionandthe Group s Painter v. Bannister
Jurisprudence,16 NOVA L. REv. 621, 627-29 (1992) (discussing the "Beyond the Best Interests"

paradigm involving the concepts of 'continuity" and "psychological parent").
7. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 319 (West 1984) (providing for a period not exceeding
fifty days).
S.

In California, the law provides for resolution of the issues in court. CAL. WELF. & INST.

CODE §304 (West Supp. 1993) (court jurisdiction); id. § 317 (West Supp. 1993) (appointment of
counsel). Therein, the county typically provides three attorneys (there may be more): a Deputy
District Attorney, representing the child; a Deputy Public Defender, representing one or both of the
caretakers (usually parents); and a third attorney, representing the social worker. Given the scarcity
of resources in the entire procedure, the social worker's attorney seems a curious luxury.
9. See, e.g., Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of Family andJuvenile Courts in
ChildAbuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 201, 201-02 (1987).
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to adopt them. t° Unfortunately, all general solutions appear to
have substantial potential for harm. If only one could be certain
about how good the parents of the child were in some more
pervasive manner than simply whether they committed some
alleged bad acts, that also would be of great help. Actually,
certainty about specific acts in the past could, at least, advance the
inquiry. Unfortunately, since the primary witnesses are young
children, they may be unable to answer questions, and older ones
may be relatively unreliable witnesses."
The above combination of circumstances almost write a job
description for an expert. As has been true of other aspects of the
law with equally difficult questions, we have enticed mental health
workers to provide that expertise. Thus, a number of issues are,
thus, left for psychiatric/psychological testimony.
SURVEY OF FORENsIc PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY IN OTHER
CONTEXTS

Child dependency is not unique in its reliance on mental health
specialists. Indeed, there appears to be an inverse relationship
between the delegation of legal issues to psychological resolution
and the ability to handle them with traditional tools. Unfortunately,
the problems are so complex and varied that all attempts at bright
line standards have failed to solve the problem.' 2

10. One of the sources of frustration in this field is the fact that coercive process applies
almost exclusively to the poor. That suggests that many problems could be solved by wealth
redistribution and, perhaps, that they will not be solved in its absence.
11. See STEPiHE J. CEci Er AL, CHILDREN'S EYBEwiN ss MEMORY 210 (1987) ("Children
traditionally have been viewed as suspect eyewitnesses because of widely held perceptions that they
are suggestible and can be easily manipulated, have difficulty distinguishing truth from fantasy, and
are frequently uncooperative.").
12.

See generally Kathleen M. Quinn et al., Resolved: Child Sex Abuse Is Overdiagnosed29

J. AM. ACAD. CHiLD AND AIoLEscENr PSYCHIATRY 789 (1989) (stating that inadequate
investigations lead to an overdiagnosis of child sexual abuse); Diana Younts, Evaluating and
Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse, 41 DuKE LJ.691 (1991); Douglas J.
Beshrov, UnfoundedAllegations,A New Child Abuse Problem, PuBLIc INTEREST, Spring 1986, at
18; L. B. Suski, Child Sexual Abuse: An IncreasinglyImportant Part of Child Protective Service
Practice, 3 PROTEcTING CHILDREN 3 (1986); Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHuD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983); Robert J. Levy, Using
"Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383 (1989); Dirk Lorenzen,
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Consider some other issues in which psychological/psychiatric
evidence is central to resolution. The insanity defense to crime,13

incompetency,14 and institutionalization" in mental health wards
have the best developed relationship. To a lesser extent, insanity
and incompetence are wild cards in most fields of law.16 It is
difficult to reconcile legal norms with the absence of free will that
has been associated with mental aberration. An accommodation to
the logic that demands notice of the alteration of mental
functioning by some has generally been provided by creating
different rules for those who are mentally ill or insane. 7
Mental illness and insanity are, of course, quite different. They
come from radically different sources, and accomplish fundamentally different ends. Mental illness is a claim that nonconforming human conduct is the product of a process of being
ill. 18 The term invites a "cure" response and, more importantly to
law, implies a lack of responsibility on the part of the sick person.
For mental health professionals, mental illness is an important
concept because the heart of their professional preparation has been
in "healing."
This Article shall not rehearse the argument that mental illness
is a myth,19 as the literature on that point is extensive.2" Nor will

Comment, The AdmLssibility ofExpert PsychologicalTestimony in CasesInvolving the Sexual Misuse
of a Child,42 U. MIAMI L. RE'v. 1033 (1988).
13. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 625 (1990).
14. See generally Jan E. Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the Elderly in

the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposalfor Statutory Refocus and
Reform, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1818 (1992); George J. Alexander, PrematureProbate:A Different
Perspective on Guardianshipfor the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1003 (1979) (hereinafter Premature
Probate).

15.

RALPH REISNEER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM

597-604 (2d ed. 1990).
16. See infra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
17. See Seymour L. Halleck, M.D., PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME: A STUDY
oF CAUSES, PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT 210, 222 (1967) ("The most important reason for
psychiatric participation in the criminal trial is a humanitarian zeal to temper the harshness of

punishment.").
18. See PAUL R. MCHUGH, M.D., THE PERsPECTIVs OF PSYcHLATRY 5 (1983).
19. See THOMAS S. SzAsz, M.D., IDEOLOGy AND INSANITY 12-24 (1970).
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this Article belabor the brooding question of the extent to which
any human conduct is truly the product of free will, recognizing
that the rationale for disparate treatment for the mad often
expresses a belief that they are different in the extent of their
control of their conduct."z It is unlikely that there will be a
popular consensus on this point and, therefore, law must struggle
with a system which at best accommodates to this necessary
uncertainty. At best, one can hope for a pragmatic solution to
current problems.
In that regard, it is interesting to note the similarity of
occasions where mental health professionals have been chosen to
help the law resolve important issues. For example, take the
insanity defense. In fact, the defense has little application to real
life. It is urged in very few cases, and is unsuccessful in most of
the ones in which it is asserted.22 Nonetheless, it comes in handy
as a safety valve for the rigors of a legal system that is often seen
as quite harsh. Many criminal defendants have committed crimes

20. See THOMAS S. SzAsz, M.D., THm MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 262 (rev. ed. 1974)
('Mental illness is a myth. Psychiatrists are not concerned with mental illnesses and their treatments.
In actual practice they deal with personal, social and ethical problems of living."); THOMAS S. SZASZ,
LAW LI ERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 18 (1963) ("[P]sychiatric and sociological descriptions and
explanations may offer promotive statements regarding the guised of cognitive assertions. In other
words, while allegedly describing conduct, psychiatrists often prescribe it.") (emphasis in original);
see also 0. Gulevich & D. Bourne, Mental Illness and Violence, in VIOLEN E AND THE STRUcOLE
FOR EXIsTENCE 27 (D. Daniels et al. eds., 1970). Gulevich and Bourne conclude their review by
commenting that "an individual with a label of mental illness is quite capable of committing any act
of violence known to man, but probably does not do so with any greater frequency than his neighbor
in the general population." Id. at 323. See generally LEE COLEMAN, THE RHION OF ERROR (1984).
21. Moral theorists have identified four principal conditions that must be satisfied under the
liberal paradigm before someone deserves moral blame for their conduct. A (1) moral agent must be
implicated in (2) the breach of a moral norm that (3) fairly obligates the agent's compliance under
circumstances where that (4) breach can be fairly attributed to the agent's conduct. Peter Arenella,
Character,Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability
Judgments, 7 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y 59, 60 (1990). Arenella writes:
To qualify as a blameworthy moral agent, the individual must have the capacity to make
moral judgments about what to do and how to be and the ability to act in accordance with
such judgments. We view moral evil as a corruption of this human potential for moral
concern, judgment and action. Thus, individuals do not deserve moral blame if they lack
these moral capacities.
Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless. Reassessing the RelationshipBetween Legal and
MoralAccountability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1511, 1518 (1992).
22. See William Bennet Turner & Beverley Ornstein, Distinguishing the Wicked from the
Mentally Ill, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1983, at 42.
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for reasons that society cannot honor, but that many can understand. Some are driven by poverty to steal so as to provide food for
themselves or their loved ones. 3 Others are driven to rage by
societal discrimination.24 We do not excuse crime because of such
factors, but invariable conviction would also strike some as
excessive when imposed on those whose conduct seems understandable. While it would be seen as frivolous to dismiss every
hundredth case to show societal compassion, it is acceptable to find
a very small number of persons legally irresponsible.' No harm
is done to the societal desire to punish because, quite commonly,
the "acquitted" person is placed in a mental institution.26 Indeed,
mental confinement may exceed the involuntary incarceration
allowed by the penal system.27 At the same time, since the mental
health system is defined as therapeutic and not oriented toward
punishment, the result leaves the appearance of compassion. It is
difficult to imagine how differently the objects of that
"compassion" view what is happening to them."
Using mental health professionals as the necessary experts in
such cases also allows attorneys to wash their hands of the dubious
conclusions elicited. Mental health experts are notoriously bad
witnesses, and many lawyers have considerable luck in discrediting
them in cross examination.29 In part, this is so because of the lack
of reliability and validity of diagnoses discussed below. Experts can

23. For a classic example, see VICTOR HUGO, Lns MIsERABLEs (1862).
24. See, e.g., George J. Church, The Fire this Time, TIME, May 11, 1992, at 18.
25. This point is, of course, a limited one and depends on the absence of societal
condemnation of the specific person chosen. When John Hinkley was acquitted by reason of insanity
in the shooting of President Ronald Reagan, there was mass protest.
26.
HENRY STEADMAN, BEATINo THE RAP IN THE REIGN OF ERROR ix (Lee Coleman ed.,
1979) (stating that every year thousands of citizens accused of crimes though not convicted by a
court are confined in mental institutions).
27. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69 (1983).
28. A client the author represented, Roy Schuster, was released from a state mental health
facility because of constitutional infirmaries in his hospital incarceration. United States ex. rel
Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969). In seeking
certiorari, the state urged that the result would cause unmanageable dislocations. Apparently, when
word of Schuster's release from the hospital spread through the institution, most of the inmates
immediately sought to be returned to prison in preference to remaining in therapy.
29. See JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PsYcIATRIc AND PsYCHOLOGIcAL TESTIMoNY 3 (1981).

1471

Pacific Law Journal/ VoL 24
easily be confronted by opposing expert testimony. When someone
is acquitted, the psychiatrists can be blamed.
Another legal problem in which mental health professionals
play a large part is conservatorship (guardianship). Unlike the
insanity defense, conservatorship proceedings are quite common."
The stated goal of the procedure is to identify persons who are
incompetent to handle their personal or financial affairs, and to
provide a court appointed conservator (guardian) to act for them. 3
As the author has written on numerous occasions, 32 conservatorship proceedings, in fact, accomplish many other objectives
because they control the ward's wealth. For example, these
proceedings may provide support for children or may be a means
of disadvantaging those who are not in the family but are receiving
some of its assets.33
Conservatorship criteria, like those in dependency, are rich in
vague concepts. In conservatorship, often the chief criterion is
mental illness itself. 34 Some individuals are made wards expressly
because of their old age, 35 a concept not so much vague as it is
cruel. 36 As with the application of the insanity defense, it would

30.

COMMISSION

ON LEGAL PROBLEMS

OF THE ELDERLY,

AMERICAN

BAR ASS'N,

GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ELDERLY: A PRIMER FOR ATTORNEYS 1 (1990).
31.
See generally GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, WRITING A LIVING WILL: USING A DURABLE
POWER-OF-ATrORNEY (1988).

32. E.g., George Alexander, Avoiding Guardianship,2 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECt 163, 164
(1990); ALEXANDER, supranote 31, at 25; George Alexander, PrematureProbate: Who Benefitsfrom
Conservatorship?,13 TRIAL 30, 32 (1977); GEORGE J. ALEXANDER & TRAvis H. D. LEWIN, THE
AGED AND THE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 3 (1972).
33. The plight of Ben Weingart is a good example. See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 2.
34. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5350-5371 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (statutory
procedures for Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) conservatorship for someone with a -mental disorder
or impairment by chronic alcoholism"); see also Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care:
The Law of Conservatorship in California,61 S. CAL. L. REv. 273, 275 & n.4 (1988); cf. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1801(a),(b) (West 1991) (Conservatorship requires a finding that the person lacks the
ability to properly provide for "his or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or
shelter" and/or "manage his or her own financial resources or resist fraud or undue influence.").
35. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 34, at 279.
36. When the ABA Committee on Uniform State Laws proposed to move its Uniform
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act for adoption by the House of Delegates, the ABA
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly (of which the author was then vice-chair) unanimously
(one abstention) opposed it because, if allowed, the declaration of guardianship was based on the old
age of the prospective ward. It also asked for time to debate the issue in the House of Delegates. It
was not given time, and the House of Delegates adopted the provision summarily. When the
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be difficult to achieve the desired results without taking advantage
of there being people willing to assess decisions as being irrational
irrespective of their surface reason. History attests to the fact that
one need not be mad to have an affair, at least in the sense that
there appear to have been many more affairs than could be
accounted for by even the most pessimistic assessment of the
degree of madness. 7 It takes a mental health professional to
classify certain sexual choices as the product of mental incapacity,
thus having one partner placed in conservatorship, which does not
incidentally rescue family resources from the outside influence.38
In such cases, the expert's role is to "medicalize" what would
otherwise be understood as perfectly human behavior.
The bulk of those declared incompetent are relatively poor and
powerless.39 This is not only true because a richer person's
resources can often be marshalled to defeat the process, but even
more so because relations rarely initiate proceedings against those
who are still productive wage earners; presumably because they
benefit more from sharing in income than they would by trying for
a share of prior earnings. The conventional view of conservatorship
proceedings is that they provide a private remedy. It was surprising
to the author, when I first did field work, to find that the state was
the most frequent petitioner.40 Later work has proven the state's
dominant role to be typical.4 At first, one wonders why that
should be the case since usually, the state is not petitioning for
incompetency for those who have wealth that they might
mismanage. In fact, the wards are typically destitute.42
For those who are accustomed to using incompetency for
family members who want to prevent waste of assets, the state's

Commission persisted in its complaints, the ABA Committee on Uniform Laws declared the age
provision "optional."
37. FRANK PrimAN, M.D., ROMANTIC AFFAIRS: TIMPORARY INSANITY 184 (1989) ("Many
of us really do seem to believe that the best thing in life is the intense disorientation ('the picturesque
unusualness') of being in love.").
38. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
39. ALEXANDER & LEwI, supra note 32, app. at 158 (Table 3).
40. Id. app. at 157 (Table 1) (noting that 282 of 419 cases were instituted by the state).
41. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 34, at 280.
42. Id. at 280.
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interest is sometimes perplexing when pointed out. While it is still
not clear to me how bringing such proceedings is routinely
justified, it is at least obvious that creating a conservator-ward
status creates great management efficiency for the state. The state,
once it becomes the conservator, can make many decisions for the
ward that may reduce the expense of his or her indigence.43
Perhaps a greater reason still is that conservatorship allows the
state to assent in the name of the ward to its own procedures.44
The dark side of involuntary commitment, much like
conservatorship, provides another opportunity for taking action
against the bothersome, but powerless. For example, in the criminal
field, the involuntary commitment process allows locking up
defendants against whom there is inadequate evidence for
conviction.45 It is possible to combine civil commitment and
criminal process by charging people with a crime, but having them
incarcerated as incompetent to stand trial. If they are found
incompetent to stand trial, they need not be convicted. While
criminal law demands substantial evidence before anyone can be
taken from the streets, many whose dangerousness is much more
dubious can be placed in institutions for their supposed benefit and,
of course, the benefit of the state. Thus, society has a useful
mechanism for its own protection.
This procedure has also been used to remove people who are
not dangerous to society, such as people who are "in need of
treatment" or suicidal.46 Sometimes it even permits removing

43. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2900 (West Supp. 1993) ("The public guardian may take
immediate charge of the property within his county of persons referred to him for guardianship or
conservatorship when such property is being waste4 uncaredfor, or lost.") (emphasis added). See
generally George Alexander, PrematureProbate:Who Benefits From Conservatorship,13 TRiAL 30,
32 (1977).
44. As these explanations are based on conjecture rather than empirical research, it would be

interesting to study why conservatorship cases are brought by the state. The study should include not
only the stated reasons but also a tracing of the uses made of conservatorship once it is in state

hands.
45. See Carol A.B. Warren, Involuntary Commitmentfor Mental Disorder: The Application
of California'sLanterman-Petris-ShortAct, 11 LAw & Soc'Y 629, 631 (1977).
46. Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally 1ll, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1190, 1218-19 (1974).
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otherwise powerful people from prominence.47 It obviously
accomplishes two things simultaneously. First, it removes the
incarcerated person from contact with the rest of the populace.
Secondly, it stigmatizes, and thus minimizes, that person's
utterances.
The political use of psychiatry is easiest to appreciate in a
totalitarian country. Thus, the example of the former Soviet Union
proves particularly useful. There, the use of incarceration in mental
hospitals in the service of the state's political ends became so
notorious that the nation was threatened with expulsion from the
World Psychiatric Association. Yet, if one examines the success
of the Soviet practice, it becomes clear how useful it can be in
achieving social goals. It should not surprise anyone that it has
been used in this country against some prominent political figures
in what appears to be a similar manner. Ezra Pound, 49 General
Walker and many others 50 were removed from prominence
through hospitalization. Others have made the point that the
medical aspects of those cases (as opposed to their political facets)
are extremely weak.5' There are a number of other cases of
politically prominent figures who were disposed of behind the bars
of institutions but, as in the other forms of alleged madness, the
bulk of those disposed of have been relatively powerless.
What makes involuntary commitment, especially commitment
premised on danger to society, even more pernicious is the fact that
the imprecision of diagnosis of future danger is so great that it

47. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
48. They resigned, instead. See Censure Soviets on Mind Abuses, BERKELEY GAzETrr,
1, 1977, at 1.
49.

Sept.

See THOMAS S. SzAsz, THE THERAEurIc STATE: PSYCHIATRY IN THE MIRROR OF

CURR EVENTS 138, 161-64 (1984) (describing the trial of Ezra Pound in which he was declared
"insane and mentally unfit for trial" and involuntarily committed as a mental patient for twelve
years).
50. Szasz names Secretary of State Forrestal, Governor Earl Long, Ernest Hemingway and
Mary Todd Lincoln as persons removed from prominence through hospitalization in the United
States. He also names Margo Krupp (wife of Fritz Krupp, the German industrial magnate) and Ignaz
Semmelweis. Id. at 236-37.
51. See id. at 18, 141, 178.
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forces health professionals to overpredict dangerousness, 52 thus
locking up many who never prove to be a danger. 53 This aspect
of mental health law stands in sharp contrast to the criminal law
ideal of accepting the improper release of twenty guilty people if
necessary to prevent the incarceration of a single innocent
54
person.

While none of the legal principles sketched were expressly
designed to accommodate state needs, it is apparent that they
nonetheless do so. In general civil law, the state is usually more
detached from the results. In fact, other than insuring that disputes
can be settled justly and peacefully, the state may well be
indifferent as to whether plaintiffs or defendants succeed in
litigation. In civil litigation, the results of alleged mental illness are
handled less consistently. In tort law, madness is largely
irrelevant.55 In contracts, it is sometimes exculpating.56 Foolish
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds when the state does not
have its own needs.

52. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 711-16 (1974).
53. Usually, there is no way to determine whether those involuntarily placed are, in fact, more
dangerous than the general population because no one is inclined to experiment with allowing
dangerous conduct. On occasion, however, mandated release provides such an opportunity. In
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), the United States Supreme Court allowed the release of
some prisoners who had clinically been determined to be especially dangerous and not afforded a
review of their commitment by jury trial because they were civilly committed after the termination
of a prison sentence. Ia&at 110, 114-15. A follow up study tracking tie men in question found them
to be no more dangerous than the population at large. See generally Henry J. Steadman & Gary
Koeles, The Community Adjustment and CriminalActivity of the Baxtrom Patients1966-1970, 129
AM. J. PSYCHOL 3 (1972).
54. Researchers have found that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are often based on
the psychiatrist's desire to "play it safe." According to John Monahan, "fi]fone overpredicts violence,
the result is that individuals are incarcerated needlessly. While an unfortunate and, indeed, unjust
situation, it is not likely to have significant ramifications for the individual responsible for the
overpredictions." John Monahan, The Preventionof Violence, in CoMMUNMY MENTAL HEALTH AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYsTEM 13 (John Monahan ed., 1975).
55. See George 3. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil
Wrongs, 43 NomnR DAME L. REv. 24, 28 (1967).
56. George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., From Contractto Status via Psychiatry,
13 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 537, 538 (1973).
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EFFECT OF STATE REGULATION ON FORENSIC
PSYCHOLOGY/PSYCHIATRY

There is also an economic side to the use of professional expertise
which tends to entrench professional opinions. The apparently
private aspect of diagnosis and healing of madness is a distinctly
regulated industry. Not only does the practice of medicine require
a license, it is probably the most expensive general license in the
country. To become a physician, it is necessary to complete
college, be admitted to and graduate from medical school, usually
a four year process in this country, and then to complete a
residence in medicine and, often, to do further work to be accepted
into a specialty such as psychiatry.57
It is, consequently, understandable that there is pressure from
those licensed to insure that their practice is monopolized by those
with similar investments. It was inevitable that, when psychologists
made a claim to participating in the healing of the "mentally ill,"
there was strong resistance from the organized medical
association.58 To this date, the physicians (psychiatrists) have the
exclusive right to physical treatment such as surgery, electroconvulsive therapy, injections of medicine and, usually, prescribing
medicine.59 They attempted to have exclusive access to the major
source of health treatment resources, insurance, by having insurers
require that all billing by psychologists go through physicians (who
presumably exacted a monopolist's fee for the service). Antitrust

57. See generally THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDs OF THE UNITED STATES, A
GUIDE TO THE ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL PRACtiCE ACT (1956).

58. Eg., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 468-69 nn.2, 4 (1982) (providing
psychotherapy treatment under Blue Shield Plans).
59. Medical practice acts are regulatory statutes that prohibit the practice of medicine by any
person without a license. There are many language variations in the state laws, but they all contain
similar provisions. They all provide for the creation of a board charged with the duty of examining
applicants for medical licensure. C. JOSEPH STaTLER ET AL., DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW
15 (1962).
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concerns for competition, however, blocked that use of monopoly
6
power. 0
The inclusion of psychologists as suppliers of healing for those
mentally ill did not radically affect the field except to the extent
that the supply of healers was increased. The costs of credentials
are almost as high as a physician's. To be a licensed psychologist
generally requires a college education followed by admission to
and graduation from a doctoral program in psychology and,
usually, an extensive apprenticeship.6" Thus, psychologists also
have a substantial investment in keeping groups of prospective
"patients" and, consequently, in characterizing those under
discussion as mentally ill. Furthermore, the high costs of entry has
deprived these professions of substantial numbers of practitioners
with contrarian perspectives. Once having earned licensure, their
motivation to deny the utility of professional testimony is greatly
diminished.
The other group who influences the legal outcomes of claims
of madness are attorneys. Attorney licenses, as most readers of this
Article know, are also very expensive, and lawyers are no more
anxious to share their market power with others than are
psychiatrists and psychologists. Some mental health issues are cast
in ways that uniquely fit legal skills. For a determination that
someone is insane, as in the defense to crime, it is necessary to
deal with such issues as knowledge of right and wrong, 62 capacity
to form "intent, 63 and the causal relationship between mental
state and the act in question. 6' Such issues are understandably not
ones that mental health professionals want to address.

60.

Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478-79, 484-85 (1982) (holding that

customer who received psychotherapy treatment from a psychologist suffered sufficient injury under
antitrust laws for not being able to recover payment from insurance company due to policy that
reimbursement would only be allowed if treated under a physician's referral).
61. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2914 (West 1990).
62. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,361 (1970);
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 491 (1895); Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718,71921(1843).
63. W. PAOE KEETON Er AL., PRosSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs, § 135, at 1073

(5th ed. 1984).
64. George Anastaplo, Psychiatryandthe Law: An Old-FashionedApproach, in BY REASON
OF INSANT Y: ESSAYS ON PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 167 (Lawrence Zelic Freedman ed., 1983).
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Healing is regulated, but it is not necessarily performed in such
regulated facilities as hospitals that can exclude unlicensed
competitors. Law is exclusively enforced in regulated institutions
and, while unlicensed advice may transgress on the preserve of
attorneys, key resolutions must be achieved in (or sanctioned by)
courts.6' Thus, the legal profession may be more generous in
sharing its definition of aberrant behavior with others, as it knows
it retains monopoly control of outcomes.
The mental health system, in general, is a system that reflects
very traditional views, and is not structured to tolerate divergence
of perspectives. It provides the sorts of previously mentioned
societal management mechanisms.' It has found resistance in well
established civil rights and their spokespeople. Thus, after a history
of unfettered use of the involuntary commitment mechanism, a
67
procedural due process wave created some counterbalance.
Advance directives have begun to counteract the threat of improper
conservatorship."

The criminal system has been modified in

minor ways to protect against improper intrusion of madness issues.69

65. EFg., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1801-1803 (West 1991) (conservatorship); id. §§ 7000-12591
(West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (administration of estates of decedents); CAL CIV. CODE §§ 4350-4385
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (dissolution of marriage); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp.
1993) (juvenile dependency).
66. See supra notes 22-53 and accompanying text.
67. The California Legislature enacted the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, an example of
legislation implementing due process reforms to involuntary commitment laws. CAL. WELl. & INST.
CODE §§ 5000-5523 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992). Carol Warren describes the reform effort:
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act provides for two initial stages of involuntary civil
commitment: a 72-hour hold for treatment and evaluation by mental hospital personnel,
and a 14-day commitment period for a person who as a result of a mental disorder, is a
danger to others, or to himself or gravely disabled. (LPS §§ 5150, 5250). It then
authorizes additional commitments for mental disorder- 90 days (renewable for additional
90-day periods) for persons dangerous to others (LPS §§ 5300, 5304); 14 days (not
renewable) for persons dangerous to themselves, and a 30-day temporary (LPS § 5352.1)
and one-year subsequent (LPS § 5361) conservatorship which may be reviewed each year
for persons gravely disabled (LPS § 5350).
Warren, supra note 45, at 630.
68. The use of advance directives for this purpose was frst suggested by me in Premature
Probate.See Alexander, supra note 14, at 1027-33.
69. See Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards Relating to
Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 375, 386, 389-892 (1985) (discussing
modifications such as allowing defense motions, discovery, and obtaining pretrial release despite the
defendant's incompetence). Bennett refers to the chapter entitled CriminalJustice Mental Health
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FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD DEPENDENCY

As applied to children in dependency cases, madness has a very
significant role. In part, this role derives from the state's strong
interest in protecting children. Not only does the state provide the
normal range of protection through age neutral provisions of
criminal law and its process, it also has established special criminal
code sections that punish child abuse70 and provisions requiring
many who would likely notice such abuses to report them. 7 The
state also provides express exceptions to standard privileges to
assure that reports be made. 2 In addition to criminal process, the
state uses a civil procedure to take children from abusive parents,
and to place the children elsewhere, often in foster care. The
procedure is very broadly cast. In California, a juvenile court
obtains jurisdiction on finding at least a substantial risk of nonaccidental physical harm by parents or guardians, or such harm by
failure to adequately supervise, or that the child is depressed
because of parental/guardian conduct. The above represents merely
a few reasons sufficient to begin the process. Once the court has

Standards which appears in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE 2 (2d Supp. 1986).
70. Eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) (failure to provide); id. § 271 (desertion of

child under 14 with intent to abandon); i. § 271(a) (abandonment or failure to maintain child under
14); id. § 273a (willful cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of child; endangering life or health); id.
§ 273d (corporal punishment or injury of child). See generally Lucy A. Younes & Douglas J.
Besharov, State ChildAbuse and Neglect Laws: A ComparativeAnalysis, in PROTECrINo CHILDREN
FROM ABUSE AND NEaLECT: POuCY AND PRACTICE 353, app. at 413-15 (Douglas J. Besharov ed.,
1988) (compiling state-by-state list of criminal sanctions for criminal acts against children).
71. / g., Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11174.3 (West
1992) (requiring reports by "child care custodians," "health practitioners," and the "employee of a
child protective agency" among others). See generally Younes & Besharov, supra note 70, app. at
357-58, 366-89 (describing state reporting law procedures).
72. !Eg.,CAL. EvID. CODE § 972(d)-(e)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (exception to marital privilege
for dependency proceedings or child of either spouse); id. § 985(a) (exception to privilege for
confidential martial communications for crimes committed against a child of either spouse). See
generally Younes & Besharov, supra note 70, at 409-10; Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Competency

of One Spouse to Testify Against Other in Prosecutionfor Offense Against Child of Both or Either,
93 A.LR. 3d 1018 (1979).
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jurisdiction, the streamlined process of a dependency case
73
begins.
Dependency cases dispense with a number of rules that
otherwise apply to litigation. In California, to protect children from
the glare of public proceedings, the hearings are not held in open
court. The record is sealed.74 The principal report, by a social
worker, is admitted into evidence despite its recitation of hearsay,
and may, in fact, provide the principal evidence used to determine
jurisdiction. Thus, evidence otherwise inadmissible may, in fact, be
determinative.75 All of these practices are based on the desire to
protect children as well as the inherent limitations in the sort of
case the state would be able to bring if criminal law standards or
their equivalent were imposed.76
In dependency proceedings, a crucial issue often is presented
through psychological or psychiatric evidence. If child abuse has
been alleged, professional testimony will quite regularly be used to
establish the fact of the abuse having occurred and the identity of
the perpetrator.77 Such testimony is often necessary in dependency
cases because the child victim is too young to testify. 7 Other
issues also call for mental health expertise. Whether the caretaker
will be a threat to future care of the child, whether she is an
alcoholic or uses drugs, and how responsible she is in general are
issues of this sort. Indeed, in California, there are specific grounds
for granting a change of caretaker when the parents are

73. E.g. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE §§ 300-395 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (jurisdiction and
procedure statutes for dependency). See generally Younes & Besharov, supra note 70, at 358-60,
403-12.
74. Eg., CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE §§ 389, 826-830 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (statutory
procedures for destruction, release, and sealing juvenile court records). See generally Younes &
Besharov, supra note 70, at 397-400.
75. See In re Malinda, 51 Cal. 3d 368, 376,795 P.2d 1244, 1247,272 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990).
76. See Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony To Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM.
L. Q. 383,385-86 (1989); Michael Fine, Comment, Where Have All the ChildrenGone? Due Process
and Judicial Criteriafor Removing Childrenfrom Their Parents' Homes in California,21 Sw. U.
L. REV. 125, 126-28 (1991).
77. See Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimony in ChildAbuse Prosecutions:A Spectrum
of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 166 (1988).
78. See Susan B. Apel, CustodialParents,ChildSexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond
Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REv 491, 496-97 (1989).
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incompetent to raise the child.79 A finding under that provision
expressly requires taking the testimony of a mental health
professional.8"
Current dependency procedures are certainly zealous. One
cannot doubt that the state has expressed its concern for the welfare
of children. It has streamlined procedure, coerced information
through compulsory reporting laws and waiver of privilege, and
provided for secret and informal testimony in assessing the relevant
facts. It often finds claims of innocence as merely proof that the
child is endangered.81
A recent Grand Jury in San Diego called its system "out of
control." 82 The Grand Jury estimated that up to sixty percent of
the cases that resulted in removing children from their homes
should not have been decided as they were. It is difficult to

79. CAL. Civ. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992). This section, in pertinent part, provides:
An action may be brought for the purpose of having any child under the age of 18 years
declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his or her parents when the
child comes within any of the following descriptions... (6) [w]hose parent or parents are
mentally disabled and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.
Id, See generallyPaul Berstein, Termination of ParentalRights on the Basis of Mental Disability:
A Problem in Policy and Interpretation, 22 PAC. U. 1155 (1991) (criticizing broad judicial
interpretation of the provision).
80. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992) ("The evidence of any two experts, each
of whom shall be either a physician and surgeon,. . . or a licensed psychologist.., shall be required
to support a finding under this subdivision.-).
81. The Grand Jury reports:
If the [dependency] court believes a molest occurred and the family member could have
been responsiblea "true finding" is made and wardship declared. If a father denies molest
and a true finding is made, he suffers the ultimate Catch-22 - he can either admit and
take a chance that the department will allow him to begin reunification with his family
or he can deny and no reunification will occur.
But the irony does not end there. If the spouse supports her husband's denial, she
cannot be trusted to protect the child and she too will not be allowed to reunify with the
child., a current assertion is that the mother must have known all along and failed to
protect. That then becomes a protective issue and reason to remove the child from the
mother.
Still worse, if the child denies the molest, this can be seen as part of a "child abuse
accommodation syndrome and an additional reasons why the child should have no contact
with the parents.... Thus, all members of the family can deny a false molest allegation
and, in each instance, the system uses the denial as evidence of guilt.
SAN DmGo CouNTY GRAND JuRy, CHiL SEXUAL ABusE, ASSAULT, AND MOLEST IsSUES, Report
Nos. 8, 2, 3 (June 29, 1992) (citation omitted).
82. Leonard Bernstein, Social Workers Lookfora Solution, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8,1992, at Bl.
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evaluate this report.8 3 Even assuming that it was correct as to the
current situation in San Diego, there is no assurance that San Diego
is representative of programs in other cities.
Some general questions do suggest themselves, however. The
preeminent one appears to be whether the dependency process
provides better protection for children than would occur in its
absence. That, in turn, requires an assessment of the adequacy of
the criminal system that punishes child abuse independently. It also
requires a judgment of the cost, psychological and financial, paid
by children who are forcibly removed from the homes of parents
who have not abandoned them, and by their parents. One should
also recognize the societal costs of providing the procedure and its
enforcement, and inquire whether those funds could better be spent
in counselling children and parents.
After accounting for the costs of having a process, one must
evaluate the likely improvement when children are removed from
their parents and placed in foster or other alternative care. To do
this, one would need to know the accuracy -of decisions in
dependency cases.84 Just as there are many anecdotes concerning
the serious plight of children being raised by abusive parents, so
there are others about terrible foster care arrangements. Only if,
on balance, it seems likely that foster care will be superior to the
care of what are almost always natural parents should it be
attempted. The law assumes that the process is concerned with
ultimately improving the home environment for children. In theory,
the law uses the dependency process as an intermediate step to
ultimate reunification; however, substantial dislocations are
involved in both the interim separation and the supervision of
reunification. In fact, many children are not reunited with parents
who want them.8"

83. Bernstein, supra note 82, at BI.
84. If, for example, the San Diego Grand Jury is correct that more child removal cases are
inappropriate than appropriate, that would seem to suggest a clearly negative answer.
85. See Fine, supra note 76, at 128-29 & n.25.
86. See Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifeline to BiologicalParents: Their Effect on
Termination of ParentalRights and Permanence, in PRoTmcnNO CHIMREN FROM ABUSE AND
NEOLEcT.: POLiCY AND PRACrICE 166 & n.30 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1988).
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The most pressing question, however, would appear to be
whether the process is worth the personal costs for all involved.
Several factors suggest it might not be. First, children need both
attachment to parental figures and permanence in relationships as
part of growing up well adjusted.87 Second, parents are usually
strongly emotionally attached to their children, and their anguish at
having them removed must be considered as well.
In viewing the system as it functions in California, several
questions leap to mind. First, one must consider whether a process
that is so deprived of resources can be expected to work well.
Currently, the attorneys and social workers involved in the
dependency process have a staggering number of simultaneous
cases.8" Even if there were no overload, one is left to wonder how
the decisions could be correctly resolved given the complexity of
the question of alternative parenting of small children. So many
intangible considerations affect good parenting that the
responsibility for finding substitute parents is daunting.
Second, one is also led to reexamine the law's rejection of so
many safeguards of the criminal justice system. It cannot be true
that society lacks zeal in eradicating crime, thus there must be
reasons other than softness on crime that explain why criminal
defendants enjoy so many protections that accused parents do
not.8 9 If there is concern that innocent people not be criminally
convicted, why is there not concern that innocent parents are
deprived of their children? While one can easily agree that children

87. See GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 6, at 6 (every child needs the 'unbroken continuity of
[an] affectionate and stimulating relationship with an adult."); see also Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note
86, at 164-65 (stressing that preserving the relationship to the "biological" parent should be given
greater attention beause of its importance in child development).
88. See, e.g., William W. Patton, ForeverTorn Asunder: CharteringEvidentlary Parameters,
the Right to Competent Counsel and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in California Child
Dependency and ParentalSeverance Cases,27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 299, 300 n.1 (1987) (noting
that, in 1985, 17,913 child abuse or neglect proceedings were instituted in Los Angeles).
89. See Levy, supra note 76, at 385-87 & n.13 (discussing how dependency proceedings do
not include a requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a federal constitutional right to
counsel for indigent parents, and the right to confront all witnesses due to special hearsay provisions);
see also Patton, supra note 88, at 303-51 (discussing differences in the right to counsel, privilege
against self-incrimination, and the rules governing admissible evidence in dependency proceedings).
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should be protected, why is there not equal solicitude for the
predictable victims of future crimes?
In the final analysis, cases that do not appear to involve
ongoing physical or sexual abuse, which could be established in
criminal court, turn on difficult questions of how to evaluate prior
conduct and how to predict future conduct. Not surprisingly, these
questions are delegated to social workers."° Social workers, in
turn, often use psychologists or psychiatrists to make such
decisions.9

While the process leaves many brooding doubts about which
the author hopes to comment in future installments, this Article
focuses on the portion that involves mental health professionals. As
in other matters of law in which they have allowed themselves to
be embroiled, mental health professionals bring dubious clarity to
the difficult problems in child dependency. In a sense, it is curious
that this point must be made so often in so many contexts. Civil
commitment, the largest mental health related field in the middle
of this century, suffered all of the vagaries of mental health
testimony for a long time before the reformers of the sixties
convinced legislatures how unreliable and invalid psychiatric
testimony was likely to be.' While current law still relies
excessively on such testimony, some safeguards are in place to
counteract its impact and to assure that psychiatric prediction and
recreation of the past are not alone sufficient to incarcerate people
for indefinite periods.93 Despite that fact, the use of mental health
opinions in child placement cases appears to be innocent of any of

90. See CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE §§ 272,280-281 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (provisions
allowing social workers to prepare social study report); Fine, supra note 76, at 127, 138 (stating that
judges depend mainly on social workers to make dependency decisions).
91. See Edwards, supra note 9, at 226 ("Evaluations are often provided by medical or
psychological experts utilized by the investigators.").
92. SARMUJ. BRAKEL &RONALD S. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DIsABLED AND THE LAW, 55-59
(1971).
93. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing due process safeguards); see also
Grant H. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment Issues: A Retrospective and
Prospective Assessment, 60 TUL. L. REV. 927, 933-36 (1986) (discussing O'Conner v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975)).
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the doubts that affected comparable testimony in mental
hospitalization.
Are there factors in child placement that make it likely that
mental health expertise is more appropriate to this field? It is not
likely that psychological predictions of future behavior are any
better here than in other relationships. For example, whether a
father is likely to abuse his children, be violent in their presence,
or inadequately provide for his children's needs is no clearer to a
professional than whether a person accused of being mentally ill
will be dangerous in the future--the clearest example of unreliable
psychiatric testimony.9" Indeed, a professional cannot improve on
the findings of a non-psychologist investigator in determining what
has happened in the home in the past.
On the other hand, unlike her role in the problems of adults, a
properly trained expert may be able to inform a court about how
well adjusted a child is in its present setting, and whether any
psychological problems may require treatment. 95 Without
considering whether maladjustment is a disease that these experts
are qualified to treat, it, at least, is a matter that relates to their
training and experience. Their opinion may well provide one factor
that would be useful to the courts in making a placement decision.
One should not confuse this comment with a suggestion that the
testimony might also indicate which parent made the child happier
or whether one or the other performed specific acts, good or bad.
As the last section of this Article demonstrates, those issues are
well beyond the ability of experts.
Furthermore, in many child placement cases, even though the
child is the party most interested in a proper outcome, the child is
often unable to assist directly in its resolution. Young children may
not understand or be able to communicate important facts. 96 Some
facts may be unduly upsetting to youngsters.97 This obvious
problem has created great frustration in a system attempting to

94.
95.
96.
97.
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See Ennis & Litwack supra note 52, at 699-708, 711-16.
See Edwards, supra note 9, at 227.
JoHN E.B. MEYERS, CHILD WrnNEsS LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 3.1-3.28 (1987).
Id. §§ 2.10, 4.2.
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assist children. It may be appropriate to call on mental health
workers to report the state of knowledge concerning victim silence
or other behavior. For example, it is useful for a jury to know that
a molestation victim may not want to talk about the events for one
of several reasons.98 It is useful to report that unusually disruptive
behavior may be linked to conflict within a child.99 The
temptation is, of course, to press an additional step and invite the
worker to testify that a given silence indicates a specific child's
having been abused or that disruptive behavior is the equivalent in
any given case of testimony of harm caused by the primary
caretaker.
The latter testimony would be much more decisive. On the
other hand, it is precisely the type of information that the worker
is unable to provide accurately. Even if the worker could
understand the past by observing present child behavior or could
elicit a story from the child after establishing a relationship with
her, several very serious problems would attend such an effort.
Prescinding from the lack of scientific basis for the finding and a
pattern of excessive certainty about conclusions, what is ultimately
elicited is essentially what would not have been admitted in the
first place: The impressions of a small child about its surroundings
and about traumatic events in its life. It seems strange to have a
high threshold of testimonial competency for young children and
then to admit a version of their stories sifted through still another
mind.
Even if the mental health worker is totally neutral, the
testimony is untrustworthy but there is no reason to expect
neutrality since most of the workers who participate in the
dependency process do so regularly."t ° Consequently, they are
likely to have expectations of outcome derived from prior cases.
After deciding that a number of prior children were abused by their
fathers, for example, the next father seen will more likely be found

98.

See id. § 4.9 (describing how to deal with delays in reporting sexual abuse).

99.

Ict §§ 4.15,4.17 (describing how to use the "sexually abused child syndrome" to bolster

credibility of a victim).
100.

See Levy, supra note 76, at 390.
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to have also abused the child even though the evidence is much
weaker." 1 Confounding that problem, mental health workers as
a group are quick in making a decision and surprisingly confident
in their conclusions. 2
So far, the author has assumed a lack of intentional bias in the
decision. In life, unfortunately, that is often unrealistic. Those who
are paid for their testimony are doubtless influenced by the
viewpoint of those who pay for their services. Of course, that is to
some extent true of all paid experts. The difference between mental
health experts and others lies in the fact that so much less certainty
attends the sort of information they present.
Beyond the possible distraction of one's client's interests,
mental health workers are also subject to broader pressures. As is
the finding of "dangerousness" in the involuntary commitment
cases, testifying that a given parent presents problems is relatively
safe. If the testimony results in denying child custody, the expert
will never be proven wrong. If custody is granted or retained
anyway, and nothing untoward happens, it simply means that the
alleged culprit is on guard as a result of the expert testimony and
the scrutiny it has brought. On the other hand, if the expert
testimony makes the custodian out as well qualified, and the
custodian subsequently strikes the child or has sexual relations with
it, the psychologist/psychiatrist will be blamed.
One must also consider political correctness as public attitudes
about child abuse matters change. Recently, far fewer complaints
have been made, presumably because of the conventional wisdom
that child complaints about abuse were mostly incorrect and that
children simply invented such stories."0 3 Now, at least as far as
fathers sexually abusing their female children is concerned, the
claim is popularly conceived of as true even though the data is
101. Donald N. Bersoff, JudicialDeference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers:Imposing Simplistic
Solutions on Problems ofCognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329,341
n.51 (1992) (citing a study which concludes that clinicians from state mental hospitals are likely to
overestimate the number of paranoid schizophrenics in hospitals and to overdiagnose paranoid

schizophrenia).
102. Id. at 347 n.83.
103. See generally, Arthur H. Green & Diane H. Schetsky, True andFalse Allegations of Child
Sexual Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 25 J. Am. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 449 (1986).
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scanty. " No data suggests that there has been any substantial
change in the actual rate of such conduct, 05 and I doubt that
there has. Given the public preference to believe that fathers are
abusers, that testimony will be better accepted than its opposite.
Thus, there is yet another reason making it preferable to come to
one conclusion as opposed to the other.
Finally, and perhaps most perniciously, social class may
provide pressure. Dependency cases do not exclusively relate to
children of the underclass. Nonetheless, they so often concern
children of poor families0 6 that it is not much of an
overstatement to consider this branch of law uniquely focused on
the children of poverty. In some part, the selection of cases is
influenced by the fact that many of the children are called to the
attention of state officers because they are on welfare rolls.'0 7 In
part, children of richer parents can be siphoned from the system by
satisfactory private contractual arrangements for child care. I doubt
that those factors and other neutral ones sufficiently explain the
selection of cases. Many, I suspect, are the product of society's
greater eagerness to supervise the powerless. At least, they are
explained by the fact that the poor are less able to marshall
resources to resist the forces of the government.
Once dependency proceedings are initiated, parents are given
strict prescriptions for their lives should they want their children
back. They must be drug free and limit the use of alcohol. Their
homes must be clean and orderly, and they must adequately
provide for the children's needs and wants. 8 Sometimes, the

104. Id.; see also Levy, supra note 76, at 387.
105. See Levy, supra note 76, at 387-88 & nn. 21-22 (discussing data showing thatwhile report
rate of child sexual abuse has increased, so has the number of false or unsubstantiated allegations,
usually in divorce custody disputes).
106. See Roy H. Pelton, ChildAbuse and Neglect: The Myth of Classlessness,in THE SOCIAL
CONTExT OF CHuLD ABUSE AND NEOLEcT 23, 24-30 (Leroy H. Pelton ed., 1981).
107. See id. at 26-27 (noting that reports of child abuse among poor people may be influenced
by fact they are subject to -public scrutiny" by receiving welfare). But see id, at 29, 36 (arguing that
the higher rate of child abuse is more due to the effects of poverty than being subject to public
scrutiny).
108. See Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 86, at 167-68.

1489

Pacific Law Journal! Vol. 24
sheer burden of the requirements, such as required classes,"0 9
makes it impossible for parents to qualify. Of course, the social
workers who administer the system are typically middle class, as
are their mental health worker colleagues."' The author gets the
uncomfortable feeling that some of the evidence is based on a
general notion that children deserve to be elevated from their lower
class lives to something more approaching the lives of those who
testify about them. Mental health workers have been asked to fill
in gaps in information by examining the actions of young children
and deducing "abnormalities" from them. In their assessment of
norms, it is critical whether mental health workers consider lives
of impoverishment normal for poor people. Otherwise, achieving
the norm will simply have to be accomplished by taking the
children from the parents and placing them somewhere where there
are more adequate resources.
Regardless of the parent's social class, one need not
accommodate violence or child neglect. If the issues of deprivation
are clearly presented to the judge, the judge can distinguish
between instances in which the child is deprived of necessary
support by parents who have enough funds to do better, and cases
in which parents not providing ideally for the child are limited by
their available resources. The latter clearly does not warrant

removing the child from its home in any but the most appalling
circumstances. The same standard must apply when there is a
problem, such as drug use or alcoholism, but the problem has been
eradicated. That appears often not to be the case. Once the state
starts imposing conditions on wayward parents, it commonly strays
from those designed to assure that the original problem is solved

109. The San Diego Grand Jury report notes that reunification plans will invariably require that
the offending spouse complete Parents United. SAN DIMGO GRAND JURY, supra note 81, at 3. If drug
use or excessive use of alcohol is alleged, the parents are customarily required to attend the program
appropriate to their problem as well. Most, but not all, support services are paid for by the state
without parental reimbursement. Edwards, supra note 91, at 226.
110. Stuart Butler, A Conservative's War on Poverty; Razing the Liberal Plantation,NAT'L
REv., Nov. 10, 1989, at 27 ("The Great Society spawned a vast middle-class poverty industry: public
housing managers, social workers, job-training specialists, day-care providers, and the like.").
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to other issues insuring "better" parenting."' The ability of
parents to accommodate the latter appears often to be overlooked
as an issue." 2
Once one departs from descriptions of behavior that can be
readily understood by the judge and views the child's welfare from
the standpoint of its psychological well being, there is considerably
less necessary focus on the economic implications. The judge may
accept the conclusion without recognizing its foundation.
EVALUATING PSYCHIATRIC/PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTS

Studies of psychological/psychiatric
testimony have
demonstrated some facts with amazing consistency. Mental health
workers are notoriously unreliable. In their inability to find a
language that communicates with others in their field, they make
it very difficult to share experience. The studies are legion in which
diagnoses were found unreliable."' While the profession
continues to hope that the next iteration of their core work, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), will

111. One author notes that social workers often recommend services such as mental health and
parenting education classes that are not acceptable to the parents or needed and criticizes agencies
for not directing resources at the parents' perceived needs for adequate housing, increased income,
medical care, and day care. Cecilia E. Sudia, What Services Do Abusive and Neglected Families
Need?, in TIm SOccIAL CoNTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLEct 268, 280-83 (Leroy H. Pelton ed.,
1981); see also LEnoy H. PELTON, FOR REASONS OF PovmrTY 172 (1989).

112. NIoEL PARTON, THE PoLrcs OF CHILD ABUSE 196 (1985) (noting that the "financial cost
of maintaining parental contact" should not be overlooked when a child is removed from the home).

113. See generally David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and
Psychiatry,241 ScIENcE 31, 31 (1988) (referring to studies that show disagreement of experienced
psychiatrists over diagnosis, success of military recruits despite psychiatrists' recommendation for
discharge, and the inability of clinicians to separate persons with actual brain damage from those with
simulated brain damage).
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cure the problem, there is little reason to believe that it will do
so."1 Similar claims about the predecessor volumes failed.'
Without reliability, the ability to call the same condition by the
same name, there is no hope of knowing whether diagnoses are
valid, that is, whether they actually identify disorders. As has been
pointed out, mental health workers, despite these facts, make
diagnoses very quickly compared to physicians in other fields, and
have great confidence in their correctness."' Furthermore, once
mental health workers have formed an impression, it is difficult to
convince them of alternatives.117 In that regard, they may not
differ greatly from the general population. The use of their
testimony is not inappropriate because it is likely to be less
accurate than the assessment of other witnesses. Rather, it is
inappropriate because it is likely to be given greater weight than
that of lay people. Testimony is likely to be expressed in scientific
terms that make it easier to accept, and in which the judge may be
more reticent to challenge.
Serious problems exist in making the diagnoses reliable. For
example, the psychologist's or psychiatrist's repeated exposure to
child abuse is permanently likely to increase his or her propensity
to find such abuse." 8 Stereotypical factors, such as certain kinds
of drawings by children, are assumed to relate facts in a manner
wholly unwarranted by data on their validity." 9 Interviewing is,
itself, a notably unreliable technique for prediction, but it is,

114. Id. at 31-32. Faust and Ziskin wrote:
Psychiatry has been continuously plagued by difficulties in achieving reliable
classification. The American Psychiatric Association has revised the official diagnostic
manual at a quickened pace. The first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders(DSM-1) was published in 1952, DSM-11 in 1968, DSM I in 1980, and DSMH-Revised in 1987. The next revision, DSM-IV, is slated for publication....
The initial DSM-fIl field trials appeared to demonstrate improved diagnostic
reliability, but serious methodological shortcomings raised doubts about the results.
Id at 31.
115. Id. at 31, 32.
116. Bersoff, supra note 101, at 347 & nn. 82-83.
117. Id. at 347 n.83.
118. Bersoff, supra note 101, at 340-41.
119. Id. at 342.
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nonetheless, greatly relied upon by mental health professionals.12
It should also be remembered that clinicians are taught to focus on
their patient's subjective reality. When they change focus to
objective reality, they perform far more poorly. 121 One would
expect clinicians to improve in their assessments with experience

in the field or education,22and, as a group, they certainly think they
do. In fact, they do not.
When an impressionable child is brought to a mental health
clinician, there is yet another problem that may result. After the
sessions between child and therapist, it may be difficult to find out
which way the information passed. It is likely that the child
presented some information to the therapist that becomes part of
the therapist's report. But there are no safeguards against the
123
therapist having brought the information into the relationship.
It has been pointed out that, despite evidence against its validity,
mental health workers tend to trust their conclusions doggedly. 24
At some point, they may discover that truth as they believe it to
exist is not mirrored by what the child relates to them.
When adult patients fail to agree with their therapists,
psychological terms help the therapist explain that the patient is
120. Daniel Kalmeman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction,80 PSYCHOL. REV.
237, 249 (1973).
121. Faust & Ziskin, supra note 113, at 32.
122. It is yet another way to recognize the limitations of their work to note that, in a recent
study of professionals who specialize in assessments of brain behavior, there was no significant

difference in accuracy between two groups. The members of one group had almost 25 times as much
experience as the members of the other. Id.
123. It is difficult to produce examples in this field given the secrecy of hearings and sealing
of records. A set of cases were reported in Report No. 8 of the San Diego Grand Jury Report. SAN
DIEGo GRAND JURY, supra note 81. They are used in this article merely as concrete examples of the
problem. No claim is made that they are representative. Each of the cases identified were examples
of the system's abuse. One case was spotlighted because there was conclusive evidence of parental
innocence. It was the subject of a separate, more detailed report.
A daughter of a military father was raped, and he was accused of having been the rapist. He
denied the charge and was joined in the denial by the steadfast assertion of his eight-year-old
daughter, Alicia, that a stranger raped her. Alicia was removed from the home while the case
progressed. After what the Grand Jury described as 13 months of prodding by a psychologist, Alicia
was willing to admit that her father was the rapist. After two and one half years, the Department
finally tested the semen sample they had kept. It was incompatible with the father's semen. A
REPORT OF THE 1991-92 SAN DinGo CouNIy GRAND JURY, THE CASE OF ALIciA W., Report No.
6 (June 23, 1992).
124. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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wrong. She may be seen as projecting her own problems or
denying reality, to illustrate two professional buzzwords. Indeed,
the vocabulary of mental illness is almost entirely comprised of
different diseases or abnormalities to explain that there is
something untrue or inappropriate about the patient's ideas and
conduct. It is the role of some forms of therapy to make the patient
aware of these distortions and to help the patient overcome them.
Once a therapist has decided that the therapist knows the truth and
the child denies it, it may seem appropriate to insure that the child
gains insight into its error. " Such sessions create the obvious
danger that the therapist will ultimately convince the child, and
then will report the newest version to the court. Short of that,
professionals commonly report their own notions as the truth and
give the contradiction short shrift.
A perhaps less obvious result of sessions of the sort just
mentioned is their impact on the child, and, since this Article
concerns dependency cases, the child's later testimony. If the
mental health worker has been active in seeking the child's
reconsideration of events, what will emerge later? Will it be the
child's true perception of events? Will it be the child's adopted
story taken from the therapist? Will it be some amalgam? Can
anyone be certain? At least, the intermingling of the therapists
ideas with the child's will leave later testimony ripe for harsh cross
examination centered on making recollection out as having been
manipulated. The use of experts might thus jeopardize the later use
of the child's testimony.
The opposite is, of course, also quite possible. A child may
well be pretending abuse when none has occurred. This could be
the result of a rich fantasy life, comments made by an older
sibling, or anger for one of the many things that parents do in
raising children. Would the mental health worker know that the

injury was falsified? Probably not. Several studies make the same
point: Clinicians are poor at detecting malingering even when they
are expressly looking for it.126 When they are not led to look for

125.
126.
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it, results are, of course much worse. In a now famous study, the
experimenter asked children to lower their test performance. He
then showed the results to appraisers asking for their diagnosis, and
most found the results abnormal and diagnosed the test takers as
being brain damaged. Although malingering was listed as one of
three possible causes, not a single practitioner chose that correct
result. 127

Not only does the use of mental health professionals lead to
additional expense, the potential for error and other problems, it
also expressly substitutes for the litigational system. There are
many problems in litigation, but as Professor Bersoff points out, a
day in court provides the persons involved in the procedure more
satisfaction. 128 For all of its well known faults, the normal
adversary system brings a sense of appropriateness and closure that
no administrative substitute achieves. Although, dependency cases
are heard by a court, so much testimony is presented by
professional expert -testimony that parents and children old enough
to understand what is happening will be disappointed in how
different the hearing appears from their model of judicial fact
finding. Testimony is summarized and likely cannot be directly
challenged. Witnesses "testimony" may have been summarized by
others so that the witness cannot be cross-examined. In short, many
of the attributes of trials which conventional wisdom suggests lead
to truth are gone. Parties will frequently leave the hearing with the
feeling that they did not have a day in court.
CONCLUSION

Child placement in dependency cases is difficult work. It can
be, and often is, done badly. The cost in the emotions of parents,
their children, and perhaps a number of other potential parents, is
enormous. There is no evidence that, on balance, the lives of
children are improved. Though there are wonderful success stories,
horror stories also abound. The recent Grand Jury report on the

127.
128.

Faust & Ziskin, supra note 113, at 32 (reporting on a test by Faust and others).
Bersoff, supra note 101, at 363-68.
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practice in San Diego is a reminder that failures in the system are
not obvious and require unusual dedication to document.
No one relishes the thought of children abused or neglected in
the homes of uncaring or even sadistic parents. Such images fire
the imagination and lead to typically American interventionist
responses. Whether the financial and emotional cost of the
intervention process is worth the price, however, appears at least
to be an open question. In any event, there is no reason to saddle
a difficult system with the same form of expertise that caused
devastating results in the confinement and conservatorship cases.
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